

commentaries which find a difficulty in including this word but give a solution to the difficulty.

St. Thomas found no difficulty with the inclusion of this word in the definition. He simply attributed the four words to the four genera of life. "Et referuntur haec quatuor ad quatuor genera vitae de quibus superius fecerat mentionem."¹

To Francis Suarez the omission of this word from the definition caused no problem whatsoever.

Non contentus Aristoteles priore animae descriptione, quam in lib. 2, de Anima, cap. 1, tradiderat, ut illam magis declaret, et ostendat, aliam in cap. 2 subjungit, quam fere proponens in textu 18, ait: Animam esse principium horum, quae dicta sunt, et his definitam esse, vegetantem, sentientem, intelligentem, moventem. Postea vero text. 24, sic ait: Anima est quo vivimus, et quo sentimus, ac intelligimus primo. Veruntamen haec posterior non est, nisi repetitio praecedentis, ut ex ea probet, quod antea dixerat, animam esse formam substantialem.²

In the Complutensis an objection is made to the inclusion of the word movemur in the definition as superfluous but the objection is ruled out.

Nec obest, si contra has particulas dicas primo superflue poni, particulam illam loco movemur, nam tantum sunt tres species animarum, scilicet vegetativa, sensitiva, et intellectiva, et unaquaeque earum sufficienter manifestatur per proprium actum sibi correspondentem, vegetativa quidem per vegetari, sensitiva vero per sentire, intellectiva autem per intelligere: ergo superfluit particula illa loco movemur, cui peculiaris anima non correspondet. Respondetur enim, quod cum Aristoteles in praesenti intendat tradere diffinitionem animae, per quam prior illius diffinitio valde manifestatur, et appareat: ac proinde per quam eius essentia multum innotescat, non debet ei vitio imputari, quod particulam illam, loco movemur, ad magis manifestandam naturam animae addiderit,

¹ St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 273.

² Francis Suarez, Tractatus Tertius, De Anima, Liber I, c. 3, Opera Omnia, ed. Andre, Paris, Vives, 1856, vol. 3, n. 1.

quia per eam quippe per rem maxime notam natura animae valde perspicua manebat.¹

John of St. Thomas also saw a difficulty in the addition of the word movemur. When speaking of the different parts of the definition, he says that these four words refer to the principal grades and operations of the soul.

In reliquis particulis denotantur principales gradus et operationes animae, scilicet gradus vegetativus in illa particula 'quo vivimus,' gradus sentiendi in illa particula 'quo sentimus,' gradus intellectivus in illa particula 'quo intelligimus,' operatio autem appetendi et locomovendi in illa particula 'quo locomovetur.'²

John of St. Thomas later poses an objection to the use of the word movemur in the definition. The objection states that this word refers either to a grade of living things or a power of operations. It could not refer to a grade of living things because it follows on the sensitive and intellective grades much more than does appetite, for progressive motion depends and follows on appetite. However, if the word refers to a power of operation, why was the appetitive power left out of the definition?

In his answer to this objection, John of St. Thomas maintains that the word refers to both the locomotive and appetitive powers, for the reason that the locomotive power implicitly involves the appetitive power. The locomotive power carries out what is desired by the appetitive power. Hence, Aristotle was referring to both powers by means of an effect which is better known to us.³

We can see from a consideration of these commentaries that the inclusion of the word movemur in the definition is at

¹Collegii Complutensis Discalceatorum Fratrum Beatae Mariae de Monte Carmeli, Disputationes in Tres Libros Aristotelis de Anima juxta Miram Angelici Doctoris Divi Thomae et Scolae Ejus Doctrinam, II, d. 3, q. 1, n. 2, Matriti, Typographia Regia, 1628, p. 38.

²John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 22, col. a.

³Ibid., col. a, b.

least open to question. We must, therefore, consider this problem. However, our consideration must be based on the realization that this word was not used by Aristotle, and we must attempt to discover why he did not include it.

When we treated the words et . . . et, we saw that the second definition of the soul was a definition "secundum viam compositionis." We must now see the mode of procedure to be followed in a compositive definition.

Aristotle laid down this procedure in the Posterior Analytics. According to this procedure it is necessary to see what is similar and what is dissimilar to that which is to be defined. The first step is to discover what characterizes a certain group and then what characterizes another group of the same genus. Men have rationality in common and dogs have barking in common. However, the question is whether men and dogs also have an essential characteristic in common. If this is discovered, there will be one common definition which includes the essential characteristics.¹

The compositive mode of procedure is based on induction, for it is by induction from singulars that the similarities and dissimilarities are discovered. This procedure is especially appropriate to natural philosophy because natural philosophy deals with what falls under our senses. In natural philosophy it is easier to arrive at an immediate genus from sensible singulars than by a process of division from some remote genus. Natural philosophy proceeds by an analysis of the changes or operations which appear to the senses to discover the essential similarities or essential dissimilarities. However, in the course of this procedure, accidental characteristics must be weeded out because accidental similarities do not constitute the genus nor do accidental dissimilarities constitute the specific difference. For this reason the matter of the investigation must be clearly determined in order to see what is essential and what is accidental.

¹Aristotle, Post. Anal., II, c. 13, 97 b 6.

Aristotle concludes his distinction of the various grades of living things with the statement that all that can be said at this point in the process of discovering the second definition of the soul is that the soul is the principle of these various grades of living things and is distinguished by the powers of nutrition, sense-perception, reasoning, and movement.

Moreover, Aristotle poses a problem which carries forward this process to its final stage. The problem is whether each of these four powers is a soul or part of the soul. If they are parts of the soul, are they only distinct according to their definition or are they also in different parts of the body?

Aristotle answers these questions in the reverse order from which they were asked because the answer to the second question lays the foundation for an understanding of his answer to the first question. In his treatment of the second question he begins with the second half of the question which asks if the parts of the soul are in different parts of the body. He first considers the problem with reference to plants. It is common knowledge that plants can be divided and the parts will go on living. Therefore, since it is obvious that in plants the vegetative principle is the soul, the vegetative principle must be one in each plant but potentially many. Aristotle points out that this is also the case with other varieties of soul. When worms are cut in two, both parts have vegetative operations, sensation, local movement, and also appetite. If in the worm the vegetative, the sensitive, the locomotive, and the appetitive were each in a different part of the body, the two parts would not have them all when separated. From this example we also see a similarity to the case of the plant, for the worm has only one soul in act but many in potency. Finally, Aristotle considers the problem of the intellective power. He begins by pointing out that it is not immediately evident whether this power is in a separate part of the body or not. However, it seems to belong to a different genus of soul. This part of the soul seems to be

For example, in an investigation of the definition of likeness, the matter must be determined. Likeness of colors does not mean the same thing as likeness of figures, for what is essential to one is accidental to the other.¹

An analysis of Aristotle's approach to the second definition of the soul should reveal an application of this mode of procedure. In this analysis we must bear in mind the fact that Aristotle was seeking a compositive definition of the soul, one which would demonstrate the first definition and from which the properties could be demonstrated.

Aristotle began his investigation of this definition by distinguishing the animate from the inanimate on the basis of the fact that the animate are living. This is for him a principle gained by induction. He proceeds from this principle to distinguish the various modes of living according to the grades of living things. He distinguishes four modes of living. Because of our internal knowledge of ourselves, Aristotle first mentions the mode of living which is appropriate to living things which have the power of understanding. The second mode is distinguished on the basis of the fact that some living beings have the power of sensation. The third mode is distinguished on the basis of the fact that some living beings have the power of progressive motion, and the fourth mode is distinguished on the basis of the fact that some living beings have the vegetative power.

All living things are so divided into these four grades. Those living things which have only the vegetative powers are plants; those which have sensation without progressive motion are imperfect animals; those which have the power to move from place to place are perfect animals; and those which have the power of understanding are men. The appetitive power does not constitute another grade of living things because where ever there is sensation there is also appetite.

¹Aristotle, Post. Anal., II, c. 13, 97 b 34.

separable from the other parts of soul and separate from a bodily organ as the eternal from the corruptible.

Aristotle next answers the first part of the second question. He points out that the parts of the soul are different in definition. Sensing is a specifically different operation from thinking. Thus, the sensitive part of the soul is different in definition from the intellective part. This follows from the fact that the definition of a power is taken from a relation to its proper operation, and if the operations are different in species, then the powers will have different definitions.

Finally, Aristotle treats the question of whether the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, and locomotive principles are each a soul or only parts of the soul. It is evident that plants have only the vegetative principle. Therefore, in them the vegetative principle is the soul and not part of their soul. However, in animals the problem is more complex, and Aristotle considers this difficulty next. Some animals have all of these principles but every animal does not have every one of them. Some animals have only vegetative and sensitive powers, e.g. sponges. Some animals have vegetative, sensitive, and locomotive powers, e.g. dogs. Finally, some animals have all the powers, e.g. man. This is the basis for a differentiation and classification of animals.

It is necessary to remember that Aristotle has already established the intellective soul as belonging to a different genus of soul. The intellective soul is not a species of sensitive soul but constitutes a different genus. Therefore, this difference in animals according to their capabilities is to be understood as similar to what happens in the case of the senses. Some animals, i.e. the perfect animals, have all the senses. Other animals, e.g. a mole, have some of the senses but not all. While others, i.e. the imperfect animals, have only the sense of touch. So also, some animals, i.e. the imperfect animals, have only sensation without locomotion. While others, i.e. the perfect animals, have both. However, this constitutes only a difference

within the genus of the sentient and not a difference from the sentient. In other words, the locomotive power does not constitute another genus of soul but only causes a difference in animals, i.e. between perfect and imperfect.¹

It is important to see that this distinction between the parts of the soul is being made in order to arrive at the composite definition of the soul. If we analyze what Aristotle has done, we see that he first showed the essential dissimilarity between the vegetative part of the soul and the other parts. He then showed the essential dissimilarity between the intellectual part and the other parts of the soul, for it constitutes another genus of soul. Finally, he points out that the locomotive part does not constitute another genus of soul but rather the difference between perfect animals and imperfect animals. Therefore, since the locomotive power does not constitute an essential dissimilarity but rather an accidental dissimilarity, the word movetur should not be included in this definition.

This point can be seen more clearly in the third book of the De Anima where Aristotle brings up the problem of progressive motion.

Omnino igitur, sicut praedictum est, inquantum appetitivum animal, sic suiipsius motivum est. Appetitivum autem non sine phantasia.²

In this context he treats the distinction between the perfect and the imperfect animals.

Considerandum autem et de imperfectis quid movens est quibus sensus tactus solum inest, utrum contingat phantasiam et concupiscentiam inesse his, an non. Videtur enim laetitia et tristitia inesse.³ Si autem haec, et concupiscentiam necesse.

This distinction between the perfect and the imperfect

¹ Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 b 13 - 414 a 3.

² Ibid., III, c. 10, 433 b 29.

³ Ibid., 433 b 31.

animals is based on the perfection of the sensory powers. In imperfect animals there is only one external sense, touch. For this reason the question arises as to what moves them, or, in other words, do they have imagination and the concupiscible appetite or not. That they are endowed with appetite can be seen from their reaction to objects they perceive, for they withdraw from what is painful and go out toward what is pleasant. They could not do this unless they experienced pleasure and pain. Since desire comes about as a result of the experience of what is pleasant, there can be no sensory appetite without perception of the pleasant and painful. This perception belongs to the internal senses. However, in imperfect animals the internal senses operate in a manner appropriate to the way in which the animals move. The perfect animals which have progressive motion can imagine something far away, desire it and move toward it. The imperfect animals, on the other hand, do not move in a determinate way, i.e. toward a certain determinate place. Thus, it appears that they cannot imagine something far away, for the presence of the sensible object is required for them to imagine. This can be seen if they are poked with a sharp instrument, for they perceive the sharp instrument to be painful and withdraw. If, on the other hand, they are in the presence of food, they perceive it to be pleasant and accept it. From this it can be seen that the imagination and appetite of the imperfect animals is indeterminate and rudimentary. The imperfect animals imagine and desire something as appropriate to them but not insofar as the thing is this or that particular thing or in this or that particular place.¹

It is evident from the previous considerations that the power of locomotion constitutes a different grade of living things because not all animals which have the power of sensation have the power of locomotion. However, although the power of locomotion differentiates animals, it does not constitute an essential differentiation, as the vegetative power differentiates

¹St. Thomas, In III De Anima, lect. 16, n. 838.

plants from animals and the intellective power differentiates man from animals. Thus, we can see that in plants the vegetative principle is the soul but in animals the vegetative principle is a part of the soul. In animals the sensitive principle is the soul but the vegetative principle is a part of the soul of all animals and the locomotive principle is a part of the soul of perfect animals. In the case of man, the intellective principle is the soul and the vegetative, sensitive, and locomotive are parts, or powers, of the soul. From this it follows that although there are four grades of living beings, there are only three generically distinct parts of the soul which are essential for the definition of the soul.

If we consider the statement of Aristotle, "Nunc autem intantum dictum sit solum, quod est anima horum quae dicta sunt, principium; et his determinata est, vegetativo, sensitivo, intellectivo, et motu,"¹ we can see that he is viewing the soul in the context of the different grades of living things. In an inductive process it would be necessary to begin in this manner, for living things fall under our senses. However, the total context of his consideration determines how far he must proceed. This total context is determined by the two purposes which Aristotle has in mind: first, a scientific definition of the subject, i.e. the soul; second, a demonstration of the first definition, i.e. that the soul is the form of the body.

We have been considering Aristotle's procedure from the point of view of his first purpose. From this point of view what Aristotle was seeking was a compositive definition of the soul. Since the essential parts have to be included in the definition, whereas the accidental do not, he included a reference to the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective parts and omitted the locomotive. If we consider his investigation according to his second purpose, we should obtain the same results.

In the chapter of this thesis devoted to St. Thomas, we

¹Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 b 11.

saw his understanding of the five powers of the soul, the four grades of living things, and the "triplex anima."¹ We will not repeat these considerations here but only add what is relevant from his consideration of these topics in the Summa Theologiae. St. Thomas begins by stating that there are five genera of powers, three souls and four modes of living. He first explains the basis for saying that there are three souls. He finds the reason for this distinction in the fact that the operations of the soul surpass the operations of inanimate things in three different ways. The first of these is the operation of the rational soul. The operation of reason surpasses the operation of inanimate things to the extent that it does not even use a bodily organ. The operation of the sensitive soul involves a bodily organ, but it does not involve bodily qualities such as hot, cold, wet and dry, except as conditions of the organs required for functioning. The operation of the vegetative soul surpasses the operations of inanimate things to the extent that its operations are from an intrinsic principle while those of inanimate things are from an extrinsic principle. However, the operations of the vegetative soul are performed by means of bodily organs and bodily qualities, e.g. digestion requires the proper organs and bodily heat.

The four modes of living are distinguished according to the grades of living things. There are certain living things which have only that genus of powers which is referred to as the vegetative power of the soul, e.g. plants. Some living things have the sensitive power as well as the vegetative power but lack the power of locomotion, e.g. a sponge. Other living things have the power of locomotion as well as the vegetative and sensitive powers, e.g. the perfect animals such as the dog. Still other living things have the intellective power together with the vegetative, sensitive, and locomotive, e.g. man. The appetitive power does not constitute another grade of living things because whatever has sensation also has appetite.²

¹Cf. Chapter II, "St. Thomas," pp. 35-37.

²St. Thomas, Ia, q. 78, a. 1.

If we analyze the basis of these divisions, we can see that the three-fold division of the soul is more appropriate for a demonstration of the soul as form. The basis of this division is the fact that the operations of the soul surpass the operations of inanimate things according to three generically distinct grades or modes of being. These grades of being follow the different relations which the parts of soul have to matter. It is from this grasp of the relation of the parts of soul to matter that the conclusion can be drawn that the soul is the form of the body.

If Aristotle omitted the word movemur from the second definition of the soul it is because it was inappropriate to this definition. What is accidental as well as what is essential can be included in a description, but only what is per se must be placed in a definition. Since the second definition is meant to be the definition of the subject of the science, i.e. the soul, only what is proper to such a definition can be included.

This definition is a compositive definition of the soul as it is the principle of life according to its parts, i.e. as a potestative whole. In this context life is not to be understood as referring to the operations of life but rather to the esse viventis. For this reason the word movemur is inappropriate to this definition because locomotion does not constitute a new relation to matter over and above the sensitive and, hence, it does not constitute another mode of esse. This is why there are only three parts of the soul which are proper to its definition and these are referred to by the three words vivimus, sentimus, and intelligimus. Therefore, the word movemur was omitted by Aristotle as superfluous.

3 - The Definition as a Whole

Our final task in the consideration of the definition in

itself is to unite the parts of the definition to form a unified whole. In order to do this it will be necessary to see what determines the unity of the definition and then to interpret the parts in the light of this principle.

St. Thomas faced this same problem and gave us what he considered to be the principle of its solution. "Et referuntur haec quatuor ad quatuor genera vitae de quibus superius fecerat mentionem."¹ Applying this principle to the interpretation of the definition, St. Thomas maintained that the words vivimus, sentimus, movemur, and intelligimus taken individually refer to vital operations, and the word primo combined with the word quo indicates that the soul is a primum principium. This interpretation was forced on St. Thomas because the word movemur appeared in the translation of the text which he commented on. It is necessary to remember that the words vivimus, sentimus, and intelligimus could refer either to vital operations or the esse viventis. However, there is no esse moventis independent of the esse sentientis and esse intelligentis that constitutes a different mode of being. Therefore, it was necessary for St. Thomas to interpret the four words in conjunction as referring to the quatuor genera vitae, understanding that the perfect and imperfect animals constitute two grades of animal life but not two generically different modes of being. Otherwise, St. Thomas would have been trapped into interpreting Aristotle as having given a definition of the soul which lacked unity. He would have had to interpret the definition as stating that the soul is the principle of substantial life, or the esse viventis, according to the words vivimus, sentimus, and intelligimus and the principle of accidental life, or vital operation, according to the word movemur. An example of this interpretation is to be seen in the commentary of John of St. Thomas. He maintains that the words vivimus, sentimus, movemur, and intelligimus refer to the principal grades and operations of the soul. The word vivimus refers to the vegetative grade of the soul. The word sentimus refers to

¹ St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 273.

the sensitive grade of the soul, and the word intelligimus refers to the intellective grade of the soul. However, the word movemur refers to the operations of the appetitive and locomotive powers.¹

Our problem, however, is not exactly the same as that of St. Thomas. We do not have to deal with the word movemur, but only with three words, vivimus, sentimus, and intelligimus. Each of these words can be used to designate a different modus essendi, i.e. vegetative life, sensitive life, and intellective life; and, as we saw in the commentary of St. Thomas, there are only these three distinct modes of being appropriate to living things.² Furthermore, if each of these words was used to signify a different mode of being, then, according to this "triplex esse,"³ it would be possible to distinguish "communiter hoc triplex anima: scilicet vegetabilis, sensibilis, et rationalis."⁴

We can see in what sense, for instance, the word vivimus signifies the vegetative life if we consider the proper definition of the vegetative soul. The vegetative soul is properly defined as the principle of vegetative life.⁵ The highest vegetative function is used as a synecdoche for the whole vegetative genus of life. What was confusedly (confuse) signified in the definition of the soul by the word vivimus is clearly signified by "generativa talis quale est ipsum"⁶ in the definition of the vegetative soul. This same mode of signification would hold good for the words sentimus and intelligimus.

If the words vivimus et sentimus et intelligimus refer to

¹ John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 22, col. a.

² St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 5, nn. 282-285; cf. De Ver., q. 10, a. 1, ad 2,

³ St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 5, nn. 282-285.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., lect. 9, n. 347.

⁶ Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 4, 416 b 25.

the three genera of life and the word life is understood most properly, that is as a substantial predicate,¹ then each word would signify a distinct mode of being, albeit confusedly. Thus, the primary and proper effect of each of the three different kinds of soul would be signified by these three words. The proper effect of a power is operation, but the primary and proper effect of a form united to matter is the proper mode of esse.²

In the light of this interpretation we can now understand the following statements of Aristotle and St. Thomas in reference to this definition.

Quod igitur de horum unumquodque ratio haec³
propriissima, et de anima sit manifestum est.

Manifestum est igitur quod de unaquaque parte
animae propriissime dicitur⁴ haec definitio,
quae assignata est de anima.

In conclusion we can see that, given this interpretation of the conjunction of the words vivimus et sentimus et intelligimus, the interpretation of the whole definition follows. It is evident that the word quo designates the soul as a principle. The words, vivimus, sentimus and intelligimus taken separately signify the various modes of being according to which the soul is placed in active potency to vital operations. Since it is life according to its different grades which places the soul in potency to vital operations, this is a definition of the triplex anima; that is, of soul as a principle according to its parts, or, in other words, of soul as it is a potestative whole. The repetition of the conjunction et was used to indicate the composition of these parts, for the definition of a potestative whole must contain all of its parts in composition. The adverb primo is used to modify the verbs within the definition, vivimus,

¹St. Thomas, Ia, q. 18, a. 2; cf. IIIa, q. 50, a. 5; In IV Metaph., lect. 2, n. 558; In V Metaph., lect. 9, n. 896.

²St. Thomas, IaIIae, q. 111, a. 2; cf. Ia, q. 76, a. 6; In V Metaph., lect. 2, n. 775.

³Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 3, 415 a 12.

⁴St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 6, n. 302.

sentimus and intelligimus. The word primo indicates that these words are to be understood as signifying life as first act and not life as second act, i.e. vital operations. This eliminates the possibility of interpreting this definition as a definition of the soul considered as a motor with respect to the vital operations. From this interpretation of the definition it follows that the soul as a quo principle of the esse of the composite must be related to the body as potency or act. But since the body is not the act of the soul, the soul must be the act of the body, and precisely as the quo principle of the esse of the composite. In other words, the soul is the act of the body as its form.

Chapter VI

THE DEMONSTRATION

A consideration of the demonstration of the first definition of the soul by the second will reveal what is entailed by our interpretation of the second definition. It will also reveal the consonance between this interpretation and the teaching of Aristotle concerning this demonstration.

The first thing to be considered is the mode of procedure which Aristotle proposed to follow in demonstrating the first definition of the soul. As we have seen, there are two different interpretations of this point. St. Thomas maintained that Aristotle proposed to demonstrate the first definition a posteriori, whereas St. Albert understood the demonstration as an a priori demonstration. It will be necessary to see the source of this divergence of opinion and then what can be said to clear up this problem prior to an analysis of the demonstration itself. In order to do this, we will consider precisely what it is that constitutes the object of this demonstration and the mode appropriate to such a demonstration.

The second consideration deals with the demonstration

itself. In this consideration we will bring out the role of the second definition and show the importance of the proper interpretation of this definition. This treatment is divided into two parts. The first part deals with those who maintain that this is an a priori demonstration. We will show why they maintained this position and why this position is false. The second part deals with those who maintained that this is an a posteriori demonstration. We will attempt to establish the truth of this position on the basis of our interpretation of the second definition of the soul.

1 - The Mode of Procedure

Aristotle begins the second chapter of Book II of the De Anima with a statement of the mode of procedure which he considers appropriate in this context. He thinks that an attempt must be made to make certain what is in itself more known by means of what is in itself more obscure but more evident to us.

Quoniam autem ex incertis quidem, sed tamen manifestioribus, certum fit id quod est secundum rationem notius,¹ tentandum est iterum sic aggredi de ipsa.

As we have seen, there are various interpretations of this passage. These differences arise as a result of what seems to be an ambiguity in the text of Aristotle. There are two aspects to be considered. The first of these has to do with the general mode of procedure of the human mind; the second, with the application of this general mode to the demonstration of the first definition by the second.

Since Aristotle is clear in his presentation of the general mode of procedure of the human mind, as we have seen above when considering the interpretation of this statement in the commentary of St. Thomas, there is no further need to

¹Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 11.

consider that difficulty. We must deal, however, with the application of this general mode because it is made difficult by the statement of Aristotle which follows the passage quoted. In Greek the statement is as follows:

οὐ γάρ μόνον τό ὅτι δεῖ τόν ὀριστικόν λόγον δηλοῦν,
ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ὄρων λέγουσιν, ἀλλά καί τήν
αἰτίαν ἐνυπάρχειν καί ἐμφαίνεσθαι.

It is possible for this statement to be translated in two different ways. According to the translation of Moerbeke there are two ways to demonstrate what something is.

Non enim solum quod sit, oportet definitivam
rationem ostendere, sicut plures terminorum²
dicunt, sed et causam inesse, et apparere.

From this translation it follows that the first definition of the soul could be demonstrated either a priori, "causam inesse," or a posteriori, "causam . . . apparere."

According to the translation of Michael Scot it would appear that Aristotle had only an a priori demonstration in mind.

Oportet enim sit sermo diffiniens non tantum
demonstret quid est res, sed³ etiam causa erit
inventata et manifesta in eo.

If we adopt Moerbeke's translation and we see this statement concerning demonstration as related to the first statement concerning mode, we would be inclined to interpret the mode of the demonstration of the first definition of the soul as a posteriori, i.e. as proceeding from what is more known to us, effects, to what is more known in itself, the cause. Nevertheless, a difficulty could arise if the example which Aristotle used to illustrate his general consideration of definitions which can be demonstrated were understood as indicating the only mode possible

¹ Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 13 (ed. Ross).

² Ibid. (trans. Moerbeke).

³ Ibid. (trans. Scot); cf. Ross' English translation: "a definition should not, as most definitions do, state only the fact; it should give the reason."

in such demonstrations.¹ Since Aristotle's example is taken from geometry and the mode appropriate to this example is an a priori mode of demonstration, it would follow that the demonstration of the first definition of the soul must be a priori also.

There are two observations which can be made concerning this difficulty. The first deals with the interpretation of the demonstration of the first definition of the soul as a priori. According to this interpretation there can be no connection between the two statements cited above, and thus it would be necessary to interpret Aristotle as talking about two different things. The first statement would refer to the mode of procedure for discovering the second definition and the second statement would refer to the demonstration of the first definition. Such an interpretation is, of course, at least open to the same criticism which St. Thomas made of Averroes in another context: "Unde patet quod eius expositio non est conveniens, quia non coniungit totum ad unam intentionem."²

The second observation concerns the fittingness of Aristotle's statement about the mode of procedure to be followed in this context. As Aristotle has pointed out in the Physics, the common mode of procedure in natural philosophy is to proceed from what is more known to us to what is more known in itself. Why, then, explicitly state this mode as appropriate here? The need is realized if we consider the statement which follows. A definition is a statement of what a thing is. However, in many cases, as in Aristotle's example of the definition of a square, the definition should contain the cause of its being. Now, such a definition would be a demonstration differing only in the position of the terms³ and would naturally be from cause to effect, i.e. from what is more known in itself to what is more known to us. Therefore, Aristotle must preface this statement of the mode

¹Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 17.

²St. Thomas, In I Phys., lect. 1, n. 8.

³Aristotle, Post. Anal., II, c. 10, 94 a 12 - 94 a 13.

which he plans to use in the demonstration of the first definition of the soul if he wishes to differentiate it from the mode used in the example of the demonstration of the definition of a square.

The relation between the two statements of Aristotle cited above can be understood if we consider the fact that many definitions can be found which are like conclusions for which a proper cause can be found. This is true of the definition of a property where the definition of the subject is the cause of the definition of the property. In the Posterior Analytics Aristotle gives as examples the definitions of eclipse and thunder.¹ In the De Anima where he is considering definitions which can be demonstrated he gives an example in geometry of an operative demonstration of the definition of the property, square.² However, the soul is not a property of the body but its substantial form. Therefore, the definition of the soul cannot be demonstrated through a definition of its subject, for it is the soul which makes the body to be what it is and not vice-versa.

Also, we have the situation where the definition of a subject according to one of the four causes is demonstrated through a definition given in terms of another cause; for example, a definition through the material cause can be demonstrated by a definition through the formal cause since a "definitio quae sumitur ex causa formali, est causa definitionis, quae sumitur ex causa materiali eiusdem rei."³ If man were defined in terms of the material cause, physical organized body, this definition could be demonstrated through a definition of man given in terms of his formal cause, rational soul. However, when we try to apply this mode of demonstration to the demonstration of the first

¹Aristotle, Post. Anal., II, c. 2, 90 a 11; Ibid., c. 8, 93 a 36; cf. St. Thomas, In II Post Anal., lect. 7, n. 477.

²Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 2, 413 a 17; St. Thomas, In I Post. Anal., lect. 2, n. 17; In IX Metaph., lect. 10, nn. 1888-1894; In III Metaph., lect. 4, nn. 379-381.

³St. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 8, n. 481.

definition of the soul, we find that it does not apply. As we have seen, the definition of the soul is an ex additione definition. In an ex additione definition of a form, its proper matter must be included in the definition. However, this is not a definition through the material cause. In the definition of a complete substance, e.g. man, through the material cause, the proper matter, physical organized body, must be placed in the definition in recto. However, in an ex additione definition of a form, its proper matter must be placed in the definition in obliquo. In this case the definition is not being made through the material cause but rather through what is essential and intrinsic to the form in relation to what does not belong to the essence but is extrinsic, i.e. its proper subject.

If we do not realize the mode of definition appropriate to the soul, it might appear that the soul is being defined through its material cause. However, this is impossible for it does not have a material cause.¹ If a substantial form were already composed of matter, it could not unite with its proper matter to form a substantial unity but only an accidental unity.² Therefore, we can see that this definition cannot be a definition through its material cause but rather is an ex additione definition in which actus primus appears in recto and corporis organici physici appears only in obliquo.

Since the first definition of the soul is not a definition through the material cause, it is an essential definition for which there is no higher intrinsic cause.³ Thus, the first definition of the soul is a definition of what is directly attained, i.e. what does not have a cause, and is for that reason an indemonstrable statement of what a thing is.⁴ If we were to attempt a demonstration a priori, we would be involved in a pe-

¹St. Thomas, Ia, q. 75, a. 7, ad 3.

²Ibid., a. 5.

³St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 17, n. 1658.

⁴Aristotle, Post. Anal., II, c. 10, 94 a 11-12; cf. St. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 8, n. 479, 488.

titio principii.¹ However, this definition can be demonstrated a posteriori; that is, through its effects.²

A lack of appreciation of the mode of this definition might also make it appear that the soul is being defined primarily as related to the body. The soul would be essentially a relation to the body. However, what is stated principally in recto is the fact that the soul is actus primus. What is secondarily or consequently stated is the fact that since it is a form it is related to its proper matter, which, however, is only stated in obliquo. Therefore, soul is not being defined as a relation to matter; rather it is being defined as a form.

This consideration brings us to another important aspect of the problem, which is an understanding of what Aristotle primarily intended to prove in his demonstration of the first definition of the soul. St. Albert assumed that Aristotle primarily intended to demonstrate that the soul is the first act of a physical organized body.³ From a consideration of the mode of the definition, we can see that this position is untenable. From a consideration of what Aristotle principally demonstrated, i.e. soul is form, we can see that this was not his principal intention. Therefore, even if St. Albert could establish the fact that the soul is the first act of a physical organized body a priori, he still would not have established a priori the truth of the fact that the soul is form.

John of St. Thomas also faced the problem of demonstrating a priori that the soul is form. He first posed an argument against an a priori demonstration of soul as form. To be first act or form belongs essentially to the soul and is not an effect following on its nature. Also, for anything to be primarily that by which something is constituted is not the cause of its being

¹St. Thomas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 3, nn.441-442.

²Ibid., lect. 8, n. 479.

³St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 9, p. 207, col. b.

102

act or form. Therefore, there is not an a priori demonstration. To this objection John of St. Thomas replied by distinguishing two senses of act or form. In one way act is taken entatively, or in itself, and is distinguished against potency; in another way it is taken as form insofar as it exercises its function of informing. In the first way it is impossible to demonstrate that anything is form because the essence of a thing is indemonstrable. In the second way it is possible to demonstrate that the function of form belongs to that thing, i.e. to be primarily that by which something is constituted "in esse talis." John of St. Thomas justified this demonstration as a priori on the grounds that a predicate which looks to something else is able to be demonstrated through what is absolute and a foundation "tamquam rationem priorem." In this manner one attribute of God can be demonstrated through another.¹

As we can see from the argument of John of St. Thomas, he is demonstrating a priori the relation of soul as form to the body and not simply that soul is form, which he admits cannot be demonstrated a priori.

St. Thomas' position with respect to this aspect of the problem seems in the light of our previous considerations the most reasonable.² He maintains that Aristotle demonstrates what is in recto in the first definition, i.e. that soul is form. Aristotle further concludes as a corollary that since soul is form, it is necessarily related to the body. A form is essentially related to matter but in order to show that the soul is essentially related to the body it must be first demonstrated that it is a form. It is this very conclusion that soul is form which Plato objected to and which Aristotle indicated needed demonstration.³

The final answer to the problem concerning the proper

¹John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 26, col. b.

²St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 271, 276.

³Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 1, 413 a 9.

interpretation of Aristotle's statement concerning the mode of procedure can only be found in the actual mode which he followed. Therefore, our next consideration is of the demonstration itself.

2 - The Demonstration Itself

The controversy concerning the demonstration of the first definition of the soul by the second can be divided into the opinions of those who maintain that this is an a priori demonstration and the opinions of those who maintain that this is an a posteriori demonstration.

In the section devoted to a consideration of the opinion that this is an a priori demonstration, we will show the foundation for this opinion and we will show the misconceptions involved in it. The first commentary to be treated will be that of St. Albert, for it is his opinion which the others adopt. We will then follow the same procedure for the commentaries of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas.

The position that this is an a posteriori demonstration will be considered in the second section. We will first give an interpretation of the demonstration as proceeding from the premise that the soul is the principle of the esse viventis. We will next show the difference between this demonstration and the demonstration which proceeds from the premise that the soul is the principle of vital operations. Finally, we will consider St. Thomas' interpretation in order to see how his understanding of the second definition influenced his interpretation of the demonstration.

a) The demonstration interpreted as a priori

In the chapter devoted to St. Albert we gave his interpretation of this demonstration. However, we will very briefly restate it and give what we consider the foundation of his interpretation.

St. Albert maintained that what is commonly attributed to something, such as the fact that the soul is the act of the body, is demonstrated through the proper cause of its inherence.¹ In the case of the soul he thinks that this can be done if we can find a definition of the soul which gives the reason why the soul is the act of the body. He maintains that if we consider the soul according to its parts as the principle and cause of the life which it has (exercetur) in the body, we will have found this definition. He then constructs the demonstration which would contain this definition. The major premise which he gives for this demonstration is the fact that whatever is essentially the principle and cause of the life which is in a physical organized body is the act of a physical organized body and united to it. The minor premise is the fact that the soul is essentially the principle and cause of the life which is in a physical organized body. The conclusion of this demonstration is the fact that the soul is the first act of a physical organized body. St. Albert maintained that the first definition is demonstrated through the second definition, which states the cause for the soul's being the first act of a physical organized body. Thus, for St. Albert this demonstration is an a priori demonstration of the first definition.

The foundation for St. Albert's interpretation of the second definition can be seen in his interpretation of the word vivere. He understands vivere as the essential act of the soul.² He considers it evident that vivere is the foundation for all of the operations of the soul because the soul brings about this act in the body which it animates. St. Albert concludes this consideration with the statement that vivere is the esse of living beings. But he goes on to point out that the soul as form gives esse to the body only through life. He shows that there are two ways to consider this fact. First, it can be understood

¹St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 5, p. 201, col. b.

²Ibid., c. 6, p. 203, col. a.

in the sense that life is from the soul and in this way it is the essential act of the soul; second, in the sense that life is in the body as formally joined to it. In this second way the body is said to be a living body. Furthermore, the soul is said to live, according to St. Albert, as having life in itself and as the cause of life, just as light is luminous and the cause of other things being luminous. He further maintains that the separated substances (superiora) are said to live but with a more noble life. They have a more noble life because in them there is nothing which is moved, whereas living beings which are mortal have parts such as bones, flesh, and hair which participate in life in virtue of the different acts of the soul. In the case of the soul, life is a continuous act of the soul which gives esse to the living body. Just as esse is generally the act of the essence in that which is, so also vivere is the act of the soul in that which is animated.

If we analyze St. Albert's demonstration in the light of his understanding of vivere, we will be able to grasp his interpretation of it. The basic assumption of his interpretation is that there is a cause for the soul's being the first act of the body. He sees this cause in the fact that the soul, according to its parts, is the principle of life. However, it is not immediately evident that the soul is the first act of the body because it is the principle of life. Therefore, a consideration of St. Albert's interpretation of vivere is necessary in order to show this connection.

There are two points to be considered in this interpretation of vivere. The first is his interpretation of the role of vivere in the giving of esse by the soul to that of which it is the soul. He maintains that it is only through life that esse is given to the body, "*quia autem anima ut forma dat esse ei cuius est anima, non dat nisi per vitam.*"¹ The second point to be considered is St. Albert's statement that the soul lives,

¹St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 6, p. 203, col. a.

"viva in seipsa."¹

As we have seen in St. Albert's interpretation, the definition of the soul as the principle of life gives the cause for the soul's being the form of the body. Now, this could only be the case if life were that by which body and soul were united. In his interpretation of vivere, St. Albert maintained that life is the essential act of the soul and, thus, that the soul lives and gives life to the body. Since it is through life that the soul gives esse to the body, life is the cause of the unity of body and soul.

St. Albert's interpretation does not seem to have any foundation in the teaching of Aristotle. In fact, Aristotle explicitly condemned the opinion that body and soul were united in virtue of life. In the Metaphysics where Aristotle treated the principles of sensible substances, he first considered the formal and material principles and then the union of these principles. In his consideration of the union of these principles, he first treated certain false opinions about this union and then gave a refutation of these opinions.²

One of the false opinions which Aristotle cited was the opinion of those who said that vivere is the means by which body and soul are united, "alii vero compositionem, aut conjunctionem animae cum corpore, vivere."³ Aristotle argued that if this were the case with the union of body and soul, it would be the same with everything else. Everything would need a means of being united.

In his refutation of these false opinions, Aristotle pointed out that the truth rests on the distinction of potency and act where the proximate matter and the form constitute one

¹St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 6, p. 203, col. a.

²Aristotle, Metaph., VIII, c. 6, 1045 a 7.

³Ibid., 1045 b 12.

being, the former as potency and the latter as act.¹ According to Aristotle, a question about the cause of unity has the same answer as a question about the causes of a thing, for a thing is one insofar as it is a being. He maintained that the difficulty about the unity of a thing disappears once it is realized that the causes of the thing are matter and form related as potency and act, for they are one being. They, therefore, do not need anything to unite them.

In his commentary on this passage, St. Thomas brings out Aristotle's position.² He begins by stating the opinions of those who dealt with the problem of unity, including the opinion that vivere is the medium through which the soul is united to the body. St. Thomas then shows how Aristotle rendered these opinions untenable. The argument proceeds on the condition that the opinion that there is some medium uniting the body and soul is correct. If there is a medium in the case of the body and soul, there would be a medium in all other cases where it is a question of the union of matter and form; so that, for example, to become healthy (convalescere) would be the medium uniting the soul and health, or to be white (esse album) would be the medium uniting a surface and its whiteness, or to be a triangle (esse trigonum) would be the medium uniting figure and triangle. Since all of these examples are obviously false, it is not true that in every case of the union of matter and form there is a medium. Therefore, it is also false that vivere is the medium by which the soul and body are united since vivere is nothing else than the esse of living beings.

St. Albert's statement that the soul lives and pours (effluit) life into the body³ is also contrary to Aristotle's

¹ Aristotle, Metaph., VIII, c. 6, 1045 b 20.

² St. Thomas, In VIII Metaph., lect. 5, n. 1765-1767.

³ St. Albert, Liber II De Anima, tract. I, c. 6, p. 203, col. a.

understanding of the relation of body and soul. According to Aristotle the soul is the form of the body and together they form a living being. Furthermore, vivere is the esse of living beings. Therefore, just as esse belongs to the composite of matter and form,¹ so also vivere belongs to the composite of body and soul, and only to the soul secondarily as a principle of the composite.

In order to make the difference between the position of St. Albert and that of Aristotle even more clear, we will investigate the distinction between the words vivere and vivificare. We will consider what each word signifies and the distinction between them. We will also see what the principles of vivere and vivificare are and, thus, that to which each can be properly attributed.

If we consider the etymology of the word vivificare, we can see that it comes from the words vivere, to live, and facere, to make, so that the word signifies the act of making something live. Therefore, these two words are related to one another but signify two distinct acts. The meaning and distinction of these two acts can be clearly seen in a passage from St. Thomas.

. . . anima unita corpori vivificat corpus non solum effective, sed formaliter: sic autem corpus vivificare minus est quam per se vivere tantum, simpliciter loquendo. Nam anima hoc modo corpus vivificare potest, in quantum habet esse infimum, quod sibi et corpori potest esse commune in composito ex utroque. Esse autem angeli cum sit altius, non potest hoc modo communicari corpori.² Unde vivit tantum et non vivificat formaliter.

The soul united to the body formally makes the body live, but to make the body live is less than simply to live. The distinc-

¹Aristotle, Metaph., VII, c. 8, 1033 a 31; cf. St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 7, n. 1419; Cont. Gent., II, c. 50.

²St. Thomas, De Potentia, q. 6, a. 6, ad 8; cf. St. Thomas, De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas, c. 1, Opuscula Philosophica, ed. Spiazzi, Turin, Marietti, 1954, n. 198.

tion is based on the fact that the soul has a lower mode of esse than the angels who are said to live. The soul and the body have esse in common in that which they constitute by their composition. The angels, however, live but do not make the body live because they are not able to be the form of a body.

The second consideration of vivere and vivificare will be based on an analysis of two statements: that the soul vivifies the body and that we live. As we have seen, vivere and vivificare are two distinct acts. When we say that the soul vivifies (vivificare) the body, we are saying in effect that the soul makes the body a living body. In other words, vivificare is the first act of the soul, i.e. the act of informing, which causes us to live. Thus, the soul is the only intrinsic cause of vivifying and, therefore, vivificare is properly said of the soul. We could speak of the body or the composite as being vivified, but then we would have to use the word in the passive voice. Since vivere signifies most properly the esse of living beings, it is the first act of a living being. Thus, we can say that the soul lives, the body lives or the composite lives. Most properly, however, we predicate the word vivere of the composite and then in virtue of the fact that the soul and the body are the quo principles of the composite we can predicate vivere of them.¹

These considerations can be clearly seen in the teaching of St. Thomas. He maintains that vivificare belongs to form as its act of informing matter. He distinguishes this act from operation. The act of vivifying is the first act of form whereas operation is the second act of form, and the act of vivifying cannot be attributed to the supposit whereas operation can be.

¹"Et hoc ideo est, quia formae non proprie habent esse, sed magis sunt quibus aliqua habent esse." St. Thomas, In VII Metaph., lect. 7, n. 1419.

Duplex est actus formae. Unus qui est operatio, ut calefacere, qui est actus secundus; et talis actus formae supposito attribuitur. Alius vero actus formae est materiae informatio, quae est actus primus; sicut vivificare corpus est actus animae; et talis actus supposito formae non attribuitur.¹

St. Thomas also distinguishes between the power of formally vivifying, which he attributes to the soul as form, and the power by which God vivifies as an efficient cause.

Anima habet vim vivificandi formaliter. Et ideo, ea presente et unita formaliter, necesse est corpus esse vivum. Divinitas autem non habet vim vivificandi formaliter, sed effective: non enim potest esse corporis forma.²

If we consider St. Albert's interpretation of the demonstration in the light of Aristotle's thought, we can see the impossibility of such an interpretation. According to Aristotle, there is no cause, or medium, by which the soul is united to the body. Therefore, Aristotle's second definition of the soul does not state the cause for the soul's being the form of the body and, thus, this is not an a priori demonstration.

If we analyze the second definition in the light of what we have said concerning the words vivere and vivificare, we can see that Aristotle defined the soul as a quo principle of its first formal effect and not in terms of its essential act, to vivify. Aristotle maintained that that by which we live is said in two ways, indicating that there are two principles by which we live. Now, as we have seen, there are not two principles by which we are vivified. We are vivified by the soul alone. Thus, that by which we are vivified is not said in two ways. Therefore, Aristotle did not define the soul in terms of its essential act, i.e. to vivify.

¹St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 27, a. 3, ad 25; cf. In II Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5.

²St. Thomas, IIIa, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3; cf. "Per hoc enim, in compositis ex materia et forma, forma dicitur esse principium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae cujus actus est ipsum esse." St. Thomas, Cont. Gent., II, c. 54.

This conclusion can also be reached by considering the fact that vivere was attributed to us as to a supposit in the word vivimus. This would be possible if vivere were interpreted as the first act of living beings, or the first effect of the act of vivifying. It would be impossible if vivere were interpreted as the essential act of the soul, i.e. the very act of vivifying, because then it could only be attributed to the soul and not to us. Thus, to interpret the word vivere as the act of vivifying and then to attribute it to us as to a supposit would be a case of improper attribution.

Finally, if Aristotle had intended to define the soul in terms of its act of informing, i.e. to vivify, he could have used the word $\zeta\omega\omicron\pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\nu$ ¹.

It seems evident that St. Albert confused the two words vivere and vivificare. Since vivificare is the very act of informing, it, not vivere, is the essential act of the soul. To demonstrate from the fact that the soul is the principle of the act of vivifying could be conceived of as an a priori demonstration. However, such a demonstration would be guilty of the fallacy of petitio principii, for to state that the soul is the principle of the act of informing is to state that it is a form.

Since Aristotle's second definition of the soul states that the soul is that by which we live (vivimus), he is not defining the soul in terms of the "primus actus formae" but of the esse viventis, or the first act of living beings. Therefore, there is not a causal priority of the second definition with respect to the first, and the demonstration of the first definition is not an a priori demonstration.

By understanding vivimus as "ipsam informationem,"² John

¹Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, c. 21, Great Books of the Western World, ed. Hutchins, Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952, vol. 9, 730 a 2.

²John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 24, col. a.

of St. Thomas made the same mistake as St. Albert. He did not distinguish between the act signified by the word vivere and the act signified by the word vivificare. He failed to realize that Aristotle could attribute the act of informing to the form but he could not attribute it to us, as would be the case if the word vivimus were interpreted as signifying the act of informing. Also; he did not see that an a priori demonstration of the soul as form which proceeds from the premise that the soul is the principle of the act of informing is guilty of begging the question.

The argument of Cajetan suffers from several fallacies. In his mind the words vivimus, etc. can be interpreted in two ways: "secundum actuale exercitium" or "abstrahendo."¹ The first interpretation should be ruled out because definitions are not given in terms of existence, whether actual or potential. According to Cajetan, given the second interpretation, the demonstration is a priori.

. . . quoniam ideo anima, non solum actualiter, sed etiam in seipsa essentialiter, est actus et perfectio corporis susceptivi vitae quia in seipsa essentialiter est res cui debetur primo quod sit ratio nostrae vitae et non e converso.²

However, the soul as "ratio nostrae vitae" can be understood in three ways: as the principle which vivifies us, as the principle which lives, or as the co-principle of our life. The first is ruled out because the definition is not given in terms of vivificare. The second is ruled out because, properly speaking, the soul does not live, but it vivifies the body and causes the composite to live. The third way of understanding the soul, as "ratio nostrae vitae," is true but it does not follow that the demonstration is a priori. The soul is the "ratio nostrae vitae" only insofar as it is united to the body, where body and soul taken compositively are the quo, or co-principles, of our life, and, thus, life follows on the union and not vice

¹Cajetan, In De Anima, II, c. 2, n. 115.

²Ibid., n. 116.

versa. This is shown in the words quo vivimus where the soul is that by which we live, i.e. it is only a quo principle of what is predicated of the supposit, or in other words only insofar as it is united to matter is it a principle of life according to this definition. "Quod autem est compositum, non habet esse quandiu partes eius sunt divisae, sed postquam constituunt et componunt ipsum compositum."¹

It seems evident that the opinion that this demonstration is an a priori demonstration is based on a misunderstanding of the second definition. The second definition is interpreted as stating that the soul is the principle of the act of vivifying. This misconception is a result of confusing the act of living, expressed in the definition by the words vivimus, sentimus and intelligimus, and the act of vivifying.

b) The demonstration interpreted as a posteriori

In the consideration of St. Albert's interpretation of the demonstration we saw that this demonstration is not an a priori demonstration and that the second definition of the soul could not be interpreted as stating that the soul is the principle of the act of vivifying. We will now consider Aristotle's demonstration as a posteriori in order to discover the proper interpretation of the second definition. Since there are two effects of every form, esse and operation, we must determine from which of these effects Aristotle's demonstration proceeds. We will first consider Aristotle's demonstration as proceeding from the minor premise that the soul is the principle of life, understanding vivere as the esse viventis. We will next present two demonstrations which St. Thomas gives to prove that the soul is form. The first of these proceeds from the premise that the soul is the principle of life and the second proceeds from the premise that the soul is the principle of vital operations. Finally, we will present St. Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's demonstration in order to show the difference between his inter-

¹St. Thomas, Ia, q. 11, a. 1, c; cf. St. Thomas, De Unitate Intellectus, c. 5, n. 250, "Sicut igitur"

pretation and the demonstration as given by Aristotle. The conclusion drawn from these considerations is that Aristotle's demonstration proceeds from the premise that the soul is the principle of life.

Aristotle begins his demonstration with a statement concerning that by which we live, for that by which we live is two-fold. The question immediately arises: in what sense is that by which we live two-fold? Aristotle gives the answer to this question by drawing a parallel between that by which we live and that by which we know or are healthy.¹

In the examples, that by which we know is both knowledge and the soul; likewise, that by which we are healthy is both health and the body. In what sense is knowledge that by which we know and in what sense is the soul that by which we know? Knowledge, as the actualization of that which receives it, is that by which we know as form. The soul is that by which we know as the recipient, for the soul is capable of receiving knowledge. Health, as the actualization of that which receives it, is that by which we are healthy as form, whereas the body is that by which we are healthy as the recipient of health. Moreover, in general, the actualization is in that which is receptive and disposed to it.

In the example of health, Aristotle is assuming as evident that health and the body are the principles of a healthy person as form and subject. However, a problem arises as to which is the form and which is the subject. This problem is resolved by determining which is act and which is potency, for that which is act will be the form and that which is potency will be the subject. Since health is the act of the body, health is the principle of a healthy person as form, and the body is the principle of a healthy person as the subject.

If we consider the parallel between these examples and

¹ Aristotle, *De Anima*, II, c. 2, 414 a 4. This intention is shown by the word "sicut."

living beings, we can also say that there are two things by which we, i.e. natural living beings, live. These two are the body and the soul. Aristotle takes it as manifest that we, that is natural living beings, live by the body, and he has inductively established the soul as the principle of life according to its various modes. Therefore, the second definition of the soul, which is the minor premise of the demonstration, states that we live by the soul according to the various modes of life. Immediately after stating the minor premise, Aristotle draws his conclusion that the soul is form.

Aristotle does not give the major premise in the demonstration itself. However, from the conclusion and the minor premise, we can construct a major premise. Since the major term is the word form and the middle term is the expression that by which we live and sense and think primarily, we know that the major premise is the fact that that by which we live and sense and think primarily is form. However, this demonstration needs clarification because that by which we live is said in a two-fold way. We live by the body and we live by the soul. Therefore, Aristotle is faced with the problem of showing why it is the soul which is form and not the body.

He solves this problem by what appears to be an assumption. It is evident that we, that is living beings, are substances. However, at this point in the development of his demonstration Aristotle is not merely assuming as evident that we are substances composed of matter and form; otherwise, he would be assuming the truth of the first definition in order to prove it. Actually, the foundation for this fact has been established by induction. We are substances composed of matter and form since the body and the soul are the principles of our life, i.e. esse, and since esse is the primary and proper effect of the informing of matter by form.¹ Thus, we can conclude that the body and the

¹Although esse is the proper effect of God as efficient cause, he brings it about through form. Thus, form is the proper intrinsic cause of esse. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., IX, c. 8, 1050 a 15; St. Thomas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima, q. 1, a. 9, c.

soul are the matter and form of natural living beings.

However, Aristotle must show that it is the body which is matter and the soul which is form. In order to do this he considers substance. Substance is said of matter, form, and the composite.¹ Since Aristotle has established in the Physics that matter is potency and form is act² and we are neither of these taken singly because we live by both the body and the soul, the word substance as it refers to us, i.e. animate beings, must indicate the composite of body and soul.

Aristotle also observes that the body is not the act of the soul. This follows from the fact that not all bodies are living, whereas if the body were the act of the soul, all bodies simply because they were bodies would, therefore, be alive. For this reason Aristotle maintains that the soul is the act of the body.

From these observations the parallel between the examples and animate things can be clearly seen. A thing is said to be healthy in virtue of health and the body. Health is that by which a thing is healthy as its act and the body is that by which a thing is healthy as that which receives the act of health. An animate thing is said to live by the body and, according to the second definition of the soul, an animate thing is said to live, i.e. to be, by the soul. Since the body and soul are one with respect to life as the body and health are one with respect to health, they must be matter and form, related as potency and act. Also, since the body is not the act of the soul, we must conclude that the soul is the act of the body as form.

We can see the importance of the proper interpretation of the second definition in this analysis of Aristotle's demonstration, for the definition serves as the middle term of this demonstration. It is our contention that this definition must state

¹Aristotle, Metaph., VII, c. 13, 1038 b 1.

²Aristotle, Phys., I, c. 7, 189 b 30 - 191 a 22.

the proper and primary effect of the soul which is also the proper and primary effect of form. Aristotle defined the soul as that by which we live and sense and think primarily. Thus, according to our interpretation, the soul is being defined in terms of its proper and primary effect, life. If we use Aristotle's own interpretation of the word vivere as the "esse viventibus," we can see how the second definition serves as a middle term, for the proper and primary effect of form is the esse of a composite. Therefore, according to our interpretation of this demonstration, without the proper interpretation of the second definition, i.e. as a statement that the soul is the principle of life, the conclusion that the soul is the act of the body as form would not follow from Aristotle's demonstration.

In order to establish this interpretation we must show why it is the proper interpretation. Since, as we have seen, there is no higher intrinsic cause by which the truth of the statement that the soul is form can be established, it must be shown a posteriori. Now, the proper act of the soul is to vivify the body, just as the proper act of form is the act of informing matter. Moreover, just as there are two effects which follow on this act of informing: the esse of the composite and the operation of the composite, so also there are two effects which follow on the act of vivifying: the life of the composite and the vital operations of the composite. Therefore, it is possible to demonstrate a posteriori that the soul is form through either of these effects.

However, the demonstrations differ, depending on which of these effects is used as the middle term. When demonstrating that the soul is form from the premise that the soul is the principle of the life of the composite, St. Thomas gives the following demonstration.

Illud quo aliquid fit de potentia ente actu ens, est et forma et actus ipsius. Corpus autem per animam actu fit ens de potentia existente; vivere enim est esse viventis: semen autem ante animationem est vivens solum in potentia, per animam autem fit vivens actu. Est igitur anima

forma corporis animati.¹

When demonstrating that the soul is form from the premise that the soul is the principle of vital operations, he proceeds in an altogether different manner. He attributes to Aristotle the following demonstration which explicitly reveals the reasoning involved.

Illud enim quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui operatio attribuitur: sicut quo primo sanatur corpus, est sanitas, et quo primo scit anima, est scientia; unde sanitas est forma corporis, et scientia animae. Et huius ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu: unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima: anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis. Et haec est demonstratio Aristotelis in II de Anima.²

If we analyze the demonstration which proceeds from the premise that the soul is the principle of the life of the body, we will be able to see the reasoning involved in this demonstration. The major premise states that that by which a being in potency comes to be in act is form. The minor premise states that the soul is that by which the body, potentially existing, comes to be in act. In order to grasp the connection between the major and minor premise, it is necessary to know that life is the esse of living beings; and since the soul causes the body to live, the soul causes the body to be. Therefore, the soul is form.

It is evident that the major premise of this demonstration proceeds from what has been established in the Physics. The ma-

¹St. Thomas, Cont. Gent., II, c. 57.

²St. Thomas, Ia, q. 76, a. 1.

major premise states that that by which something which is potentially a being becomes a being in act is form. Now, this premise is based on the teaching of Aristotle that matter and form are the intrinsic principles of the being of all natural things. This premise also shows the common effect with respect to which these principles are seen to be related as potency and act, i.e. the existence of the composite. Since these principles are related as potency and act with respect to the existence of the composite, they are the matter and form of the composite, matter being the potential principle and form being the actual principle.

The minor premise of this demonstration is established by induction. First, it must be established that the body is a living body in potency. This is evident if we realize that if the body were living in virtue of itself, every body would be living and if it did not have life in potency, no body could become animated. The body is a living body in potency and by the soul it becomes a living body in act, for in virtue of the soul, the body comes to life. Thus, the body and the soul are the principles of the life of the living body as potency and act. Since vivere is the esse of the living body, the body and the soul are the principles of the being of the living body. Thus, the body and the soul are the matter and form of the composite. The body is the matter because the body has life, i.e. esse, in potency, and the potential principle of all natural things is matter. The soul is, therefore, form because it is the principle by which the body has life, i.e. esse, in act.

We will now analyze the demonstration which proceeds from the premise that the soul is the principle of vital operations in order to show the difference between these two demonstrations.

The major premise of this demonstration states that that by which something primarily operates is form. As St. Thomas points out, this premise is based on the fact that nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Thus, a thing acts in virtue of that by which it is in act. Since a thing is in act by its

form, a thing operates in virtue of its form. We can see this in the case of health and knowledge. Since health is that by which the body is primarily healthy, health is the form of the body, and since knowledge is that by which the soul primarily knows, knowledge is the form of the soul.

The minor premise of this demonstration states that the soul is that by which primarily we perform any of the vital operations of nourishment, sensation, local movement or thinking. This premise is based on the fact that that by which the body primarily lives is the soul, this life being manifested by different operations according to the various grades of living beings.

We are now in a position to appreciate the basic difference between the way these two demonstrations proceed. The demonstration which proves that the soul is form from the minor premise that the soul is the principle of life proceeds from the fact that that by which something which is potentially a being becomes a being in act is form. The demonstration which proves that the soul is form from the minor premise that the soul is the primary principle of vital operations proceeds from the fact that that by which something primarily operates is form.

There is a difficulty, however, inherent to the demonstration that the soul is form from the fact that it is the principle of operation because it could be maintained that the soul is the principle of vital operations merely as mover, motor, as for instance, the sailor of a ship. This is possible because mover and moved do not share the same act of existence, which would be necessary if they were related as matter and form. Thus, from knowledge of the fact that the soul is the principle of vital operations, we cannot yet establish the fact that we, i.e. living beings, are substances which are composed of body and soul as matter and form. Therefore, this consideration alone would not be sufficient to establish that the soul is the act of the body as its form.

Adhuc, mobile non habet esse per suum motorem, sed solum motum. Si igitur anima uniatur corpori solummodo ut motor, corpus movebitur quidem ab anima, sed non habebit esse per eam. Vivere autem est quoddam esse viventis. Non igitur corpus vivet per animam.¹

Since, as we just saw, it could be maintained that the soul is related to the body only as mover to that which is moved, it is necessary for such a demonstration to establish that body and soul are related as matter and form. Otherwise, the demonstration would have to be conditional. If the body and soul are related as matter and form and the soul is the principle of vital operations, then the soul is form. For the demonstration to establish that the soul is the act of the body as form unconditionally it would be necessary to establish that the body has its act of existence through the soul. St. Thomas evidently recognized this difficulty because he adds to the demonstration the statement, "Et huius ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu: unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit."²

If we now consider St. Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's demonstration, we can see that his interpretation is determined by his understanding of the second definition of the soul. Since, according to St. Thomas, the soul is defined as the principle of vital operations, the demonstration which proceeds from this definition must proceed in a manner such as to establish that the soul is form from this effect. Therefore, St. Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's demonstration proceeds in a manner suitable to a demonstration based on the premise that the soul is the principle of vital operations.

As we have noted above, in an a posteriori demonstration it is possible to demonstrate that the soul is form from either of its effects, existence or operation. Therefore, our problem is not whether the demonstration presented by St. Thomas is a

¹St. Thomas, Cont. Gent., II, c. 57.

²St. Thomas, Ia, q. 76, a. 1, c.

valid demonstration or not. We are certain that his demonstration is a valid demonstration that the soul is form. However, since our primary concern is the correct interpretation of the second definition, our problem is whether St. Thomas' interpretation of this demonstration is faithful to Aristotle. We know, for instance, that St. Thomas had a faulty translation of the minor premise of this demonstration. We have grounds, therefore, to question the accuracy of his interpretation. For this reason we must reconsider St. Thomas' interpretation in order to see whether his interpretation or our interpretation, which is based on the correct minor premise, is more faithful to the demonstration as presented by Aristotle himself.

In his presentation of the demonstration in the De Anima St. Thomas draws a parallel between the two principles by which we are said to be something and the two principles by which we are said to operate.¹ In both cases that which is the primary principle is the form and the other principle is the matter. But the soul is the primary principle by which we live, even though we live by both the body and the soul. Therefore, the soul is the form of the living body.

St. Thomas gives the major premise of the demonstration as follows: that by which we live and sense is said to be two-fold, one as the form and the other as the matter. He next presents the two examples of Aristotle. That by which we know is said to be two-fold. We are said to know by two principles: of these one is knowledge and the other is the soul. Likewise, that by which we are healthy is said to be two-fold: one principle is health and the other is the body. In both of these examples one of the principles is the form and the other is the matter, for knowledge and health are forms and the act of that which receives them. Knowledge is the form of that part of the soul in which there is knowledge. Health is the form of the body, which is able to be healthy. The subject of each of these

¹St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 271.

forms has an aptitude for it, as St. Thomas indicates by the word sanabilis. The act of that which is actualized, i.e. the form, which is induced into the matter by the agent, always seems to be in the thing that can be acted upon, or the patient. The patient is that which is disposed, i.e. what is suitable to undergo the actions of the agent. Furthermore, the patient is appropriate to undergo the operation of the agent to the end or to its completion. This completion is the form brought about by undergoing the action of the agent.

After he has considered the major premise and the examples used in the context of the major premise, St. Thomas takes up the minor premise: the soul is that by which primarily we live, and sense, and move, and think.¹ St. Thomas immediately interprets the four words live, sense, move and think as referring to the four genera of life. He also points out, with respect to the examples, that although we are said to be healthy by health and the body, nevertheless, health is that by which primarily we are said to be healthy. For we are not said to be healthy by the body except insofar as it has health. Likewise, knowledge is that by which primarily we are said to be knowing beings because the soul is not said to know except insofar as it has knowledge. Also, we are not said to be living beings by the body except insofar as it has a soul. For this reason Aristotle defined the soul as that by which primarily we live, sense, move, and think.

The next step in the demonstration is the statement of the conclusion. Aristotle concludes that the soul is as a ratio and species and not as matter and subject.

The final step is a clarification by which the conclusion is shown to follow from the premises. It does not seem to follow that the soul is form any more than that the body is form because we are said to live by both. For the perfection of this demonstration, therefore, Aristotle added a consideration of substance.

¹As we have seen in the Introduction, the word move (movetur) does not appear in the definition as presented by Aristotle.

Substance is three-fold. It is said of matter, form, and the composite of both of these. With respect to these three, it must be noted that matter is potency, form is act, and the composite is the animate being. The body is not the act of the soul, but rather the soul is the act of the body, which is in potency with respect to the soul. Since from the demonstration it follows that either the body or the soul is the form, and since the body is not the form of the soul, it follows that the soul is the form of the body.¹

An analysis of this interpretation will reveal St. Thomas' understanding of the second definition as well as the difference between the demonstration as presented by St. Thomas and the demonstration of Aristotle himself. The first point which must be seen is whether St. Thomas understood the second definition as a definition of the soul as the principle of vital operations or, as John of St. Thomas maintained, the principle of "*ipsum esse vivendi et sentiendi*."²

It seems evident from the reason which St. Thomas gave for maintaining that this demonstration is an a posteriori demonstration that he understood the second definition as a definition of the soul as the principle of vital operations.

Manifestum est autem, quod haec demonstratio est ex posteriori. Ex eo enim quod anima est forma corporis viventis, est principium operum vitae, et non e converso.³

Furthermore, he found it necessary to make an addition to Aristotle's demonstration which would be unnecessary if the second definition were interpreted as stating that the soul is the principle of the esse viventis. Aristotle simply said that that by which we live is two-fold just as that by which we are healthy or that by which we know is two-fold. However, St.

¹St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 271-275.

²John of St. Thomas, Cursus, p. 26, col. a.

³St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 3, n. 253.

Thomas found it necessary to distinguish two senses of this expression. The first and most evident meaning is that that by which a thing is something is two-fold. "Duorum, quorum utroque dicimur esse aliquid" However, to this, St. Thomas added the consideration that that by which we operate is two-fold. "Duorum, quorum utroque dicimur esse aliquid aut operari" ¹

This is very evidently an addition necessitated by his interpretation of the second definition because neither of the examples which Aristotle used to show what he meant by saying that that by which we live is two-fold is an example of operation. As St. Thomas himself recognized, the examples show that that by which a thing is said to be something is two-fold, for we are said to be healthy, "esse sani," ² by health and the body, and we are said to be knowing beings, "esse scientes," ³ by knowledge and the soul.

Another addition which St. Thomas made to Aristotle's demonstration is the use of the word primum in his interpretation of the examples. "Sciendum est autem, quod quamvis sanitate et corpore dicamur esse sani, tamen sanitas est primum quo sani dicimur esse Et similiter scientia est primum quo dicimur esse scientes" ⁴

In the demonstration cited above from the Summa Theologiae which proceeded from the premise that the soul is the principle of vital operations, we saw that St. Thomas also found it necessary to add to the demonstration an explanation of primum. He pointed out that that whereby primarily anything operates is a form of the thing to which the action is to be attributed. He gave as examples of this the fact that that whereby a body is primarily healed is health and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge. He concluded from this that health is

¹ St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 4, n. 271.

² Ibid., n. 273.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. (italics mine).

a form of the body and knowledge is a form of the soul because nothing operates except insofar as it is in act. Thus, a thing operates by that whereby it is in act. Now, this interpretation of the use of primum in the examples and its explanation was dictated by the assumption that the second definition is a definition of the soul as the principle of vital operations.

In his own treatment of the examples Aristotle did not use the word primum nor explain the examples in terms of the fact that a thing operates by that whereby it is in act. Rather, he explained them in terms of form and subject related as potency and act. He pointed out that knowledge or health is the form as the act of that which is capable of such an act. He stated that, in general, the act or form, which is brought about by the operation of an agent, is in that which is receptive and disposed to such a form.

If we recall the demonstration which St. Thomas used to prove that the soul is form from the premise that it is the principle of vivere, i.e. esse viventis, we can see that Aristotle's demonstration has more in common with this demonstration than with the demonstration which proceeds from the premise that the soul is the principle of vital operations. Aristotle's demonstration proves that the soul is form, based on the general principle that, of the two principles by which something is, the actual principle is the form and the potential principle is the subject. Since we live by the body and soul and the body is the potential principle, the soul is act as form.

One could argue, however, that there is no real difference between these two demonstrations, i.e. from esse viventis and from vital operations. One could say that the soul is the form of the body insofar as it is act and it is the mover of the body insofar as it is the principle of operations. However, the soul is also the principle of operations insofar as it is act because a thing acts insofar as it is in act. For this reason it would seem that the soul is the form of the body as well as its mover

in exactly the same respect, i.e. insofar as the soul is act. Therefore, there would be no distinction between the soul as it is the mover, i.e. the principle of operations, and the soul as it is the form.

To this argument St. Thomas gives a reply based on the difference between the effect of the soul as form and the effect of the soul as mover. He grants that the soul is form insofar as it is act and also insofar as it is the mover. Thus, the soul is both form and mover insofar as it is act. However, this does not destroy the distinction between the soul as form and the soul as mover, for the soul has one effect insofar as it is the form and another effect insofar as it is the mover.¹ As St. Thomas points out, the proper effect of the soul as form is the existence of the matter. "Est autem hoc proprium formae substantialis quod det materiae esse simpliciter."²

St. Thomas shows us the relation of these demonstrations as well as the difference between them. They are related insofar as the same form which causes the matter to exist is the principle of operation. They are different insofar as it is necessary to add the statement that a thing acts insofar as it is in act in order to demonstrate from the premise that the soul is the principle of vital operations.

Sed quia eadem forma quae dat esse materiae est etiam operationis principium, eo quod unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu; necesse est quod anima, sicut et quaelibet alia forma, sit etiam operationis principium.³

In another passage St. Thomas shows that he saw the impossibility of demonstrating that the soul is form simply from the fact that the soul is the principle of vital operations. The question under consideration is whether the soul is united to the body through a medium. St. Thomas poses the following ob-

¹ St. Thomas, Q. D. de Anima, q. 1, a. 9, ad 2.

² Ibid., c (*italics mine*)

³ Ibid.

jection:

Anima ut est motor corporis non unitur corpori per accidens, quia sic ex anima et corpore non fieret unum per se. Ergo unitur ei per se. Sed quod unitur alicui per seipsum, unitur ei sine medio. Non ergo anima, in quantum est motor, unitur corpori per medium.

To this objection St. Thomas answers:

Dicendum quod ex motore et mobili non fit unum per se in quantum huiusmodi; sed ex hoc motore qui est anima et ex hoc mobili quod est corpus, fit unum¹ per se, in quantum anima est forma corporis.

It does not follow that if the soul is the mover, it is the form, for if this were the case, body and soul would constitute one thing insofar as they are mover and moved. But, as St. Thomas points out, body and soul do not constitute one thing insofar as they are mover and moved but only insofar as the soul is the form of the body. Therefore, from the fact that the soul is the principle of vital operations, the conclusion that the soul is form cannot be immediately drawn. Something further must be stated, i.e. the identity of the principles of operation and the principles of being. St. Thomas expresses this by the statement "unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu."²

This analysis of Aristotle's demonstration of the first definition confirms our approach to the second definition. As we have seen, it is impossible to interpret this definition as stating that the soul is the principle of the act of vivifying, as St. Albert's interpretation actually does. The interpretation of St. Thomas is not impossible but we have seen that it is not faithful to the text of Aristotle. He must make additions to the demonstration of Aristotle without which his interpretation does not properly proceed. However, if we interpret the second definition as stating that the soul is the principle of the esse viventis, we do not have to change Aristotle's demonstration

¹ St. Thomas, Q.D. de Anima, q. 1, a. 9, ad 3.

² Ibid., c.

at all. Therefore, our approach to the second definition seems to be the proper understanding of the definition for it is faithful to Aristotle's very words as well as his teaching.

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to discover an approach to Aristotle's second definition of the soul which would be faithful to the text as well as the teaching of Aristotle. A consideration of this definition seemed necessary because the translation of William of Moerbeke, on which the commentary of St. Thomas was based, is inaccurate. The word movemur appears in his translation, but it is not to be found in any of the critical texts. For this reason, St. Thomas' interpretation of this definition was considered open to question.

Our study of the commentaries of St. Albert, St. Thomas, John of St. Thomas and Cajetan helped our investigation by revealing different aspects of the problem and by bringing up further difficulties. However, none of the commentaries was found to conform exactly to the teaching of Aristotle, either because of a false interpretation of his teaching or because of a faulty text. It was found that even the commentary of St. Thomas, which is the most accurate, does not exactly agree with the text of Aristotle.

We have accomplished two things in this thesis: the first is an approach to the second definition and the second is a confirmation of this approach. In order to arrive at our approach to the definition, we analyzed the meaning of the words contained in it. Furthermore, we confirmed the validity of this approach by a thorough examination of the demonstration of the first definition by the second.

The conclusion which we have drawn from these considerations is that the second definition cannot be interpreted as stating that the soul is that by which we live, if to live is understood as signifying the act of vivifying. Nor can it be interpreted as stating that the soul is that by which we live, if to live is understood as signifying vital operation. Aristotle's second definition of the soul states that the soul is that by which we live and sense and think primarily. Our interpretation of this definition is that the soul is the principle of the "triplex esse," according to which a "triplex anima" is distinguished, i.e. vegetative, sensitive, and intellective.¹

The role played by this definition in the science of the soul, especially with respect to the human soul, justifies our consideration of it. As Aristotle noted, the first definition alone did not yet solve the problem as to whether the soul is the act of the body as the sailor is the act of the ship.² However, by demonstrating that the soul is the act of the body as its form by means of the second definition he established this fact scientifically. Therefore, once this demonstration is grasped, Plato's dualism is no longer a scientific problem.

In a similar manner the position of Averroes that the human soul is only equivocally called a soul because it is separate from the body³ is scientifically refuted by Aristotle's demonstration. Aristotle demonstrated that the soul is form from the fact that the soul is that by which we live and sense and think primarily, thus indicating that the soul is the form of the body in the case of the intellective soul as well as the vegetative and sensitive.⁴

Although the second definition is only a small part of the science of the soul, a correct understanding of it is essential,

¹St. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 5, n. 285.

²Aristotle, De Anima, II, c. 1, 413 a 9.

³Averroes, De Anima, II, c. 21, p. 160.

⁴St. Thomas, De Unitate Intellectus, c. 3, n. 216.

for it is the principle of the science. As Aristotle pointed out in his proemium to the De Anima, "Omnis enim demonstrationis principium est, quod quid est."¹ Thus, an error in our understanding of a principle is serious "since the least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold The reason is that a principle is great rather in power than in extent; hence that which was small at the start turns out a giant at the end."² Therefore, since an error in our interpretation of this definition could result in a serious misunderstanding of the science of the soul, our thesis is an approach to a better understanding of this definition.

¹ Aristotle, De Anima, I, c. 1, 402 b 25.

² Aristotle, De Caelo, I, c. 5 (trans. Stocks), The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. McKeon, New York, Random House, 1941, pp. 395-466, 271 b 9.

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